Challenges of Volcanic Crises on Small Islands States by Jean-Christophe Komorowski et al.
Challenges of Volcanic Crises
on Small Islands States
Jean-Christophe Komorowski, Julie Morin,
Susanna Jenkins and Ilan Kelman
Abstract
Island communities frequently display speciﬁc risk-related characteristics
that are attributable to the island locations of volcano-affected commu-
nities, in terms of exposure, vulnerability and living with the volcanic risk.
This chapter examines volcanic crisis response and communication in
island communities. We analyse lessons from volcanic crises in 1976 at La
Soufrière (Guadeloupe, France), in 2005 and 2006 at Karthala (Grande
Comore, Comoros), and in 1995 at Fogo (Cape Verde). Our analysis
underscores the strong influence of deep-seated causes (historical,
political, cultural, social, economic, and environmental) on the success
and failure of volcanic risk communication, all of which are affected by
island characteristics. The case studies demonstrate the intensity of politics
that manifests in these instances—perhaps because of, rather than despite,
the smallness and tightness of the communities, amongst other island
characteristics. Consequently, improved information and less uncertainty
would not straightforwardly lead to better communication or more
harmonious acceptance of decision-making processes and of decisions.
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1
One fundamental point is the need to engage with—not just consult—
local populations regarding risk communication and decision-making,
tailoring messages to the various audiences, and being clear regarding
what is known and not known, plus what is feasible to do to ﬁll in
knowledge gaps to support decisions. Ultimately, it is necessary to foster
synergies with communities to ensure that no party or knowledge
dominates, but instead information is exchanged leading to decisions and
decision-making processes that are better understood and accepted by all
who are involved. Living with volcanic risk thus means working with
communities on their terms.
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1 Introduction
This chapter examines volcanic crisis response
and communication in island communities. We
analyse lessons from volcanic crises in 1976 at
La Soufrière (Guadeloupe, France), in 2005 and
2006 at Karthala (Grande Comore, Comoros),
and in 1995 at Fogo (Cape Verde). Our analysis
underscores the strong influence of deep-seated
causes (historical, political, cultural, social, eco-
nomic, and environmental) on the success and
failure of volcanic risk communication, all of
which are affected by island characteristics.
Island communities frequently display speci-
ﬁc risk-related characteristics that are attributable
to the island locations of the volcano-affected
communities, in terms of exposure, vulnerability
and living with the volcanic risk (Lewis 1999,
2009; Méheux et al. 2007; Mercer and Kelman
2010; Morin 2012; Pelling and Uitto 2001). In
fact, research and experience from island com-
munities has been a signiﬁcant foundation for
understanding risk, disaster risk reduction, and
disaster response, particularly in volcanic con-
texts (de Boer and Sanders 2002; Gaillard 2008;
Keesing 1952; Kelman et al. 2011; Pattullo
2000). Regarding speciﬁc vulnerabilities:
– small land size, despite large ocean territory,
can mean that even moderately sized volcanic
hazards threaten the entire territory and pop-
ulation, causing difﬁculties in planning for
risk management, and often needing to con-
sider the possibility of permanent evacuation
of the entire island,
– relative inaccessibility and remoteness from
centres can often cause problems for
decision-making,
– small populations make it difﬁcult to have
local experts for all disciplines required, yet
small populations do not necessarily increase
the community’s homogeneity meaning that
diverse cultural responses could still be
expected.
Regarding living with the risk:
– tight, kinship-based communities can build
inherent trust, sometimes supporting rapid
information dissemination and response,
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– communities with no option but to live in
close proximity to the volcano can build up
local knowledge regarding volcano beha-
viour, warning signs, and responses,
– small, diversiﬁed economies—including off-
shore livelihoods such as migration and
remittances—can sometimes permit more
nimble adjustment to crisis.
– The volcano could have provided a baseline
of robust livelihoods, such as through agri-
culture and tourism, meaning that the popu-
lation might have resources available to
support themselves for some time.
The legacy of the island case studies presented
here, over the decades during which they ensued,
has signiﬁcant implications for crisis response
plans and risk communication for potential future
eruptions—or eruption threats. The lessons are
outlined in terms of engaging with local popu-
lations regarding risk communication and
decision-making, tailoring messages to the vari-
ous audiences, and being clear regarding what is
known and not known, plus what is feasible to do
to ﬁll in knowledge gaps to support decisions.
The bulk of this chapter is presented as the
three case studies, with the lessons and island
relevance woven into the descriptions. The ﬁnal
section synthesises some general points emerging
and provides examples of ways forward.
2 Case Study 1: La Soufrière de
Guadeloupe, Guadeloupe,
Caribbean
Management of the volcanic crisis at La Soufrière
de Guadeloupe in 1975–77 remains one of the
most contentious in recent times (Fiske 1984;
Komorowski et al. 2005; Beauducel 2006; Devès
et al. 2015). The chronology of the phenomenol-
ogy, and the actions taken by scientists and
authorities to manage the crisis were summarized
by Hincks et al. (2014). The mild but persistent
seismic and fumarolic unrest that has slowly
increased since 1992 at La Soufrière volcano
(Komorowski et al. 2005; http://www.ipgp.fr/fr/
ovsg/bulletins-mensuels-de-lovsg; Komorowski
et al. 2013b, 2014) has prompted renewed interest
in geologic studies, monitoring, risk modelling,
and crisis response planning (Komorowski et al.
2012, 2013a; https://sites.google.com/site/
casavaanr/) in order to learn from the 1975–77
crisis and improve the management and response
to any potential future crisis at this volcano.
At least 6 phreatic explosive eruptions (1690,
1797–98, 1812, 1836–38, 1956 and 1976–77)
have occurred at La Soufrière de Guadeloupe
during the historical period since AD 1635. In
contrast to previous phreatic eruptions of La
Soufrière and elsewhere in the Caribbean, a
signiﬁcant period of increasing volcanic seis-
micity was recorded and felt in Guadeloupe
starting in July 1975, one year prior to the onset
of the eruption. This unprecedented and rapidly
escalating level of recorded and felt seismicity
(Dorel and Feuillard 1980; Feuillard et al. 1983;
Feuillard 2011), which in June 1976 reached
levels that were 175 times the baseline monthly
rate, was not accompanied by any modiﬁcation
of fumarolic activity. The eruption began with an
unexpected explosion on 8 July 1976. The sub-
sequent 9-month long period of explosive and
ash-venting activity was interpreted as a
still-born or failed magmatic event (Feuillard
et al. 1983; Villemant et al. 2005; Boichu et al.
2011). Syn-eruptive degassing (H2O, minor CO2,
H2S, SO2) with acid condensates (HCl, HF, Br)
led to moderate environnmental impact with
short-term public health implications.
A major controversy emerged among the
scientiﬁc community (Fiske 1984) as to whether
fresh juvenile magmatic components could be
recognised in the ejecta, thus raising the proba-
bility of a transition from a purely phreatic,
non-hazardous scenario to a highly hazardous
magmatic 1902 Mount Pelée-style explosive
scenario. The scientiﬁc disagreement was widely
echoed in the media (Loubat and Pistolesi-Lafont
1977; Farugia 1977; De Vanssay 1979; Figs. 1
and 2). On August 15, the emergency plan was
enacted by the authorities based on the system-
atic increase in seismicity and magnitude of
explosions. About 70,000 people were evacuated
from all of southern Basse-Terre for about six
months until December 15, 1976 (Préfecture de
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Guadeloupe 1977; De Vanssay 1979; Lepointe
1984, 1999). This evacuation remains contro-
versial today; however, regardless of the inter-
pretation of the eruption’s evolution, evacuation
of the population in the areas closest to and
downwind from the erupting volcano was nec-
essary due to the degassing and ash fallout.
The cost of the preventive evacuation was
estimated at 60% of the total annual per capita
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Guadeloupe in
1976 (Lepointe 1984, 1999; Blérald 1986;
Kokelaar 2002) excluding the losses of uninsured
personal assets and open-grazing livestock.
Hence, this eruption and the evacuation that
ensued rank amongst the most costly for the 20th
century (Annen and Wagner 2003) although the
eruption itself did not cause any fatalities. A few
years before the eruption, a public policy was
implemented to move the banana export port
facilities of the Basse-Terre harbour highly
exposed to Caribbean swells to the more sheltered
harbour and economic capital Pointe-à-Pitre. The
widespread long-lasting evacuation reinforced
this shift to Pointe-à-Pitre, contributing to the
demise of the economy of the administrative
capital, Basse-Terre, and to the feeling among the
population of bitterness and of being forsaken.
Lack of a comprehensive and integrated mon-
itoring network prior to and during the crisis, the
then-limited knowledge of the eruptive history,
and a tendency of caution exacerbated by the
memory of past devastating Caribbean eruptions
(e.g. the devastating explosive eruptions of Mon-
tagne Pelée in May 1902 and of Soufrière of St.
Vincent in April 1902) all contributed to a high
degree of scientiﬁc uncertainty alongside a
publically-expressed lack of consensus and trust
in available expertise. Hence, analysis, forecast-
ing, and crisis response were highly challenging
for scientists and authorities in the context of
escalating and fluctuating activity as well as
societal pressure in a small island community
(Komorowski et al. 2005; Beauducel 2006). Given
the uncertain evidence and the absence of scien-
tiﬁc consensus on the likely outlook, and the lack
prior to the crisis of a well-deﬁned and accepted
volcanic emergency response plan, the authorities
felt impelled to adopt an approach involving zero
risk of casualties from the volcano—without fully
considering other social risks emerging due to the
evacuation.
A binary manichean approach appeared in the
scientiﬁc discourse through a major conflict
between two leading, authoritative scientists,
C. Allègre and H. Tazieff, that unravelled and
escalated in the media and public (Farugia 1977;
Loubat and Pistolesi-Lafont 1977; De Vanssay
1979). Within the context of the socio-cultural
frustrations the islanders experienced, feeling to
be an unimportant appendage to the mainland,
the scientiﬁc disagreements engendered a distrust
of mainland (colonial) science. The authorities
expected and demanded that the scientists and
volcanology would provide one clear answer, not
a range of more likely or less likely outcomes.
They operated in a binary framework and
expected science to be precise, to provide the
answers, and to render decisions easier.
In fact, this crisis epitomized the growing
clash of scientiﬁc paradigms at the time: one of
observational and intuitive empirical science,
embodied by Tazieff, versus one of quantitative
science relying on models and integrating a
probabilistic framework and some degree of
uncertainty, embodied by Allègre. In the end
facing Hamlet’s dilemma—will the eruption
evolve into a paroxysmal explosive onset mag-
matic eruption or not (Fig. 1)—the manichean
framework led to a very low acceptance of
inherent uncertainty and the advocacy of the
predominance and uniqueness of one or a few
strands of evidence. The deep disagreement
between opinionated scientists who often
bypassed the responsible authority to speak
directly to the population and the media—with
the straightforwardness of attracting a substantial
audience in a small, isolated community—thus
vented the scientiﬁc debate directly to the public
without critical and consensual appraisal, forcing
authorities to seek alternative advice. Many
“special” advisors provided their own cast on the
uncertain processes developing at the volcano.
This signiﬁcantly undermined the integrity of the
scientiﬁc judgement and the trust amongst
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experts, decision-makers, and the exposed
population.
In Guadeloupe, the societal perception and
translation of these conflicting schools of scien-
tiﬁc thinking saw the rise of the image of
maverick, anti-conformist, and heroic scientists
(e.g. Tazieff) against more precautionary, con-
servative scientists (e.g. Brousse and Allègre).
A perceived contrast emerged of free, indepen-
dent scientists ﬁghting for a just cause (the
Fig. 1 a H. Tazieff and R. Brousse quarrel over La
Soufrière. After a drawing by C. Maillaud-Bourdan,
published in Guadeloupe 2000 No. 46, October–Novem-
ber 1976 (Taken from De Vanssay 1979); b The Préfet
Aurousseau and M. Feuillard reflect at the bedside of La
Soufrière. After a drawing by C. Maillaud-Bourdan,
published in France-Antilles on 27 September 1976
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former) versus scientists who became or were
perceived to be aligned with a political agenda
and to a system of governance (the latter). The
public debate thus became political and polarized
based on opposing “truths” from contrasting
scientiﬁc expertise (Fig. 2) rather than on how
science could help constrain epistemic and alea-
tory uncertainty in order to foster improved
decision-making despite uncertainty. This situa-
tion acted as an ideal crucible for fuelling a
media-hyped controversy on the crisis and its
management (Loubat and Pistolesi-Lafont 1977;
De Vanssay 1979; Farugia 1977) that was easily
prone to wild conspiracy theories. The volcano
hence became a catalyst of accumulated
island-mainland disputes—a way to engage in a
mutual catharsis of the remains of France’s
colonialist past in the region and the sequels in its
post-colonialist policies.
The controversy and the conflation of science
with long-standing political grievances had sig-
niﬁcant lasting effects on national and interna-
tional volcanology. A portion of the population
still collectively deems that the evacuation was
unnecessary or that the need was largely exag-
gerated, with many believing that the politics of
shifting towards Pointe-à-Pitre superseded sci-
ence with the justiﬁcation of applying at the
maximum precautionary principle. This has
fuelled conspiracy theories and perceptions that
the hazard and risk assessment was imported
from the mainland, that the scientists’ mentality
was disconnected from the localised island real-
ity, and that it served a political agenda that had
Fig. 2 Photo taken from a television (TF1) debate on 11
November 1976 between C. Allègre, then Director of the
Institut de Physique du Globe de Paris (left) and
volcanologist H. Tazieff (right) with J. Besançon as the
moderating journalist (Taken from Loubat and
Pistolesi-Lafont 1977)
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started prior to the eruption but was fortuitously
reinforced by the eruption. In fact, there was a
blatant underestimation by authorities, scientists,
and media, that for the evacuated and affected
population, the volcano, being the source of their
distress and livelihood loss, rapidly faded behind
the curtain of long-nurtured socio-political frus-
trations and issues of cultural identity and island
empowerment.
The eruption marked a tipping point in the
recent history of Guadeloupe and symbolized its
unresolved dilemmas and injustices. The volcano
became an excuse to publically express a pro-
found dissatisfaction in public authorities and
policy, in the centralized mainland-focused sys-
tem of governance. All protagonists failed to
recognize that politics became the real driver of
risk perception, the local agenda, and the aspi-
rations of civil society.
However, positive consequences included a
major increase in national funding for volcano
monitoring and research. Lessons learned sig-
niﬁcantly improved volcano crisis management
worldwide and notably for the nearby 1979
St. Vincent eruption. In the context of increased
population density on the volcano’s flanks and
ongoing major development plans for southern
Basse-Terre, even a 1976–77 style eruption will
likely pose major challenges to authorities and
decision-makers despite the presence of a highly
sophisticated monitoring network and the vast
knowledge subsequently acquired about La
Soufrière volcano. Thus, this infamous crisis
exempliﬁed the need for a structured and trans-
parent approach to evidence-based decision-
making in the presence of substantial scientiﬁc
uncertainty (Aspinall 2010; Aspinall and Cooke
2013; Aspinall and Blong 2015).
3 Case Study 2: Karthala, Grande
Comore, Comoros, Indian Ocean
Union of Comoros is a volcanic archipelago
(Fig. 3) and one of the world’s smallest and
poorest countries (Taglioni 2003; UNDP 2014).
Emigration is assumed by many to be the only
solution to escape poverty, so 200,000
Comorians live in France (Da Cruz et al. 2004),
which was Comoros’ colonial power until 1975.
When independence was proclaimed, France
allegedly illegally kept Maore (one of the four
Comorian Islands) under its political control,
creating a legal battle with Comoros (Oraison
2004). Moreover, the governments of each island
(Nzwani, Mwali, and Ngazidja) regularly contest
their level of autonomy from the Union federal
government. Consequently, it is difﬁcult to deﬁne
the exact prerogatives attributed to the islands’
and Union’s governments, including those linked
to the volcanic crises management (Morin and
Lavigne 2009).
Grande Comore Island (or Ngazidja;
1148 km2) is dominated by Karthala, an active
basaltic shield volcano which has erupted, on
average, every seven years in recent decades.
Volcanic hazards threaten the population, as
effusive or explosive eruptions may impact upon
the whole island (Bachèlery and de Coudray
1993), including coastal villages, Hahaya inter-
national airport, and the capital, Moroni (Morin
et al. 2016). Electricity and telephone networks
are easily and often saturated, disrupted, or
inaccessible in some parts of the island that are
out of range from the communications relay.
Chouaybou (2010) underlines that after each
major event on the island, diaspora members call
their families, contributing to the network’s sat-
uration. As with other Comorian infrastructure,
the monitoring network of the local volcano
observatory (Observatoire Volcanologique du
Karthala—OVK) is poorly developed and difﬁ-
cult to maintain, due to ﬁnancial, technical and
human resource constraints (Morin et al. 2009,
2016).
Additionally, within this context, Morin and
Lavigne (2009), Morin (2012), Morin and Gail-
lard (2012) and Kelman et al. (2015) describe
how some people consciously increase the vol-
canic risk level in their community to have an
easier access to livelihoods. For example, some
villagers repeatedly steal solar panels from the
OVK monitoring network for easier access to
electricity. Some other villagers vandalize the
OVK network to contest foreign post-colonial
“domination” (as the network was mainly funded
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by France), or to claim that their deep links with
the volcano and their customary chiefs’ knowl-
edge are enough to face the volcanic threat. Once
the network is degraded, OVK has much reduced
capacity to monitor and interpret seismic or vol-
canological activity. While authorities and OVK
have targeted this issue in their last risk awareness
campaigns, thefts and degradations continue.
The 2006 eruption demonstrated both the
authorities’ disorganization in facing crises and
OVK’s incapacity to deliver prompt, clear and
updated information (Morin et al. 2009), making
the communication process really poor. People
were informed of the eruption mainly by
word-of-mouth or by their own observations; only
a third of the population was warned by the media.
The lack of warning systems, combined with an
absence of any consistent prevention information,
created anxiety amongst islanders and affected
their responses, negatively impacting the crisis
management. One consequence was that the OVK
scientiﬁc team faced harder and more detailed
communication tasks than expected (Fig. 4).
Several ‘critical’ periods for the OVK team
were reported, the worst one being from 28 May
21:10 to 29 May 02:00, just after the eruption’s
Fig. 3 Volcanic risk and hazards zonation for Grande Comore (adapted from Nassor 2001)
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beginning. OVK faced 30 meetings and inter-
views with authorities of both Island and Union
governments, and an agglomeration of hundreds
of civilians at the OVK ofﬁce, in addition to
dozens of phone calls saturating OVK phone
facilities, while no localization of the eruptive
activity nor a scenario of its evolution was pos-
sible to provide at that time. People suspected
that scientists did not communicate because of
serious ongoing problems while the over-
whelming number of journalists was difﬁcult for
the OVK team to manage, so journalists were
sidelined for a few hours. The ﬁrst information
was given soon after 23:00, as soon as it had
been decided to fly over the volcano at dawn in
order to observe the nature and location of the
eruption. Rumours circulated by a few local and
international media (such as “lava is flowing
down the slopes of Karthala, threatening
thousands of Comorians”) immediately spread
within villages and then to the international
news. OVK team was forced to monitor the
media three times a day (dawn, noon, and eve-
ning) to be able to quickly deny any wrong
information. A protocol was established to
improve communications efﬁciency, one of the
rules being to limit the number of scientists
communicating with the media: one in Shiko-
mori (the local language) and another in French
and English.
The second main problematic period was on
29 May from 09:00–12:30, just after the ﬁrst
flight over the volcano. Once more, rumours
about the evolution and implications of the
eruptive activity spread on the island. This indi-
cates that the information given by the OVK
team was interpreted incorrectly by some jour-
nalists. 47 interviews were given during this
Fig. 4 Main components in the ofﬁcial schedule of the
local volcano observatory team during the May 2006
eruption of Karthala (translated from Morin 2012). Due to
the multiple and constant internal and external interac-
tions of the six people involved in the May 2006 crisis
management at OVK, it is estimated that 30–40% of
ofﬁcial meetings were not listed. Otherwise this register
does not include exchanges with the ofﬁcials who came to
enquire personally about the situation, nor the constant
calls received by the OVK team from inhabitants
requesting or offering information. This ‘informal’ trade
is a flow roughly equivalent to the ‘formal’ one (High
resolution ﬁgure can be accessed at: http://lgp.cnrs.fr/spip/
spip.php?article186)
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ﬁve-day-eruption, and OVK had to deny three
rumours spread through the media. A disaster
communication handbook for journalists was
conceived after the 2006 eruption, based on the
DFID handbook (2003).
The abnormally high number of interlocutors
was difﬁcult to manage for the OVK team,
showing that the theoretical procedures described
in the “Karthala Plan”, 37-page appendix to
PNPRU [National Emergency Preparation and
Response Plan (Union des Comores 2004)], were
not known. In fact, PNPRU has not been widely
disseminated or updated since it was created in
2004. For example, in 2006, it did not contain the
updated phone numbers of main risk manage-
ment stakeholders. Moreover, due to Comoros’
colonial past, PNPRU is modelled on French
plans without taking into account island contexts.
Its operational speciﬁcation sheets are not nec-
essary adapted to the traditional oral cultural
context in Comoros for dealing with locals
during a crisis (Morin et al. 2009). Warning
dissemination and general information, for
example, could rely more on the active local
religious networks and non-proﬁt organizations.
Paradoxically, because the monitoring net-
work was still out of order, and despite its team
already being overwhelmed, OVK had no other
solution than to ask, through a media
announcement, that the inhabitants deliver to
OVK any testimony about seismicity or sus-
pected volcanic activity. In response, inhabitants
made dozens of phone calls to report felt phe-
nomenon (e.g. smells and seismicity) and new
“eruptive activity” (most of the time, bushﬁres).
Calls peaked from May 30 to June 1 as earth-
quakes were felt in the Bahani area, a few kilo-
metres north of Moroni.
The main difﬁculties in volcanic crisis com-
munication on Grande Comore are mainly due to
Comoros being a poor, small, remote island
country. The small population implies difﬁculties
in ﬁnding local experts in all ﬁelds, so that vol-
canological monitoring and understanding relies
on foreign researchers from La Réunion and
mainland France. The whole territory is threat-
ened by volcanic hazards while communication
networks are very weak. OVK’s inability to
provide information, the inhabitants’ and
authorities’ lack of preparedness, and the alarmist
news disseminated by the media are amongst
main weaknesses, leading to a failure of crisis
management and crisis communication on
Grande Comore during the last volcanic crises.
4 Case Study 3: Fogo Volcano, Cape
Verde, Atlantic Ocean
Fogo volcano and island, within the Cape Verde
archipelago of hotspot volcanism, lie approxi-
mately 600–800 km west of Senegal in Africa.
Fogo Island is around 30 km in diameter and is
formed entirely of the large stratovolcano of Fogo,
which rises 2829 m above sea level and is the
most prominent and only historically active vol-
cano in Cape Verde. An approximately 9-kmwide
lateral collapse structure dominates the island, and
is open to the east with very steep headwalls of up
to 1 km (Fig. 4; Day et al. 1999). The central cone
of Pico do Fogo rises more than 1 km above the
partially inﬁlled collapse scar and is home to ‘Chã
das Caldeiras’ residents. One of the major hazards
for Chã residents, aside from drought and a lack of
basic services, is rockfalls from the steep head-
walls; more direct volcanic eruption hazards
(Fig. 5) have typically been of lesser concern.
Historical accounts indicate that Fogo volcano
experienced regular eruptions during the early
stages of Portuguese settlement (Fonseca et al.
2003) and that the summit cone of Pico do Fogo
last erupted in 1680, producing large ash falls
that rendered agricultural lands temporarily
unusable and triggered mass emigration from the
island (Ribeiro 1960). Recent activity has been
more subdued with direct experience restricted to
the effusive eruptions of 1951, 1995, and 2014–
2015 that occurred from subsidiary flank vents
and ﬁssures near the base of Pico (Faria and
Fonseca 2014).
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Ofﬁcial maps outlining potential future vol-
canic hazards are not publicly available for Fogo;
however, Day and Faria (2009) identify three
preliminary scenarios in an outline hazard anal-
ysis: (1) A continuation of post-1785 effusive
activity on volcanic ﬁssures within Chã das
Caldeiras; (2) More intense and frequent ﬁssure
eruptions similar to those during the 17th and
18th centuries; and (3) A large explosive erup-
tion from the summit of Pico do Fogo as in 1680
(Fig. 4). Additionally, the neighbouring island of
Brava, 20 km to the west of Fogo shows geo-
logical evidence of Plinian volcanism and, in
certain wind conditions, large eruptions from
Brava may be expected to deposit signiﬁcant ash
falls on Fogo Island (Jenkins et al. 2014).
Communication of the volcanic hazard and
risk on Fogo Island consists predominantly of
top-down approaches supported by local moni-
toring institutions and the army-led National
Civil Protection Service (SNPC), which was
formed after the eruption in 1995. At the time of
the 1995 eruption, Chã das Caldeiras was home
to approximately 1,300 people in three villages;
prior to the 2014 eruption, this number was
estimated at nearly 1,500 (Global Volcanism
Program 2014). A further 11,000 people in a
number of villages on the steep eastern flanks of
Fogo are exposed to overspilling flows.
Following intermittent, felt earthquakes
through late March and early April 1995 at Fogo,
a ﬁssure eruption began on the night of 2–3 April
Fig. 5 Location of Fogo Island in the Cape Verde archipelago, with inset: provisional volcanic hazard map for a large
explosive eruption similar to the 1680 event (Day 2009)
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1995. Lava fountaining and associated flows cut
off the main road into Chã and over the next
week lava flows destroyed a village, water
reservoir and a few square kilometres of fertile
agricultural land (Fig. 6a). On 8 April, remaining
residents were ordered to evacuate the Chã das
Caldeiras or face arrest (Bulletin of the Global
Volcanism Network 1995). The eruption ended
around 28 May 1995 and in the years that fol-
lowed communities and associated services such
as health and education were permanently relo-
cated outside of the collapse scar.
Within two years, Chã had been repopulated
and prior to the 2014–2015 eruption was home to
Fig. 6 a A 2009 NASA Earth Observatory satellite
image of Chã das Caldeiras showing the remaining
villages and the extent of the 1995 lava flows; b 1995
permanent relocation sites within the red outline in the
village of Achada Fuma (image Google Earth); c A build-
ing within the now partly abandoned relocation site
(photo S. Jenkins)
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around 1,500 people with most of the population
living in Portela and Bangaeira (Fig. 6a), as well
as a burgeoning wine and tourism industry
(Jenkins et al. 2014). The failure of people to
permanently relocate following the 1995 eruption
is attributed to the close social and economic ties
that Chã residents have to their place of origin and
because of unsuitable relocation sites that lacked
sustainable sources for livelihood. Relocation
sites, subsidised by the German government, were
positioned outside of the collapse scar in areas of
relatively low hazard to the south of the island;
however, they provided very small living quarters
and limited-to-no agricultural land (Fig. 6b, c).
For the family-centred communities for whom
farming was the main source of livelihoods for
sustenance and trade, these sites offered an unvi-
able alternative to Chã das Caldeiras (Fig. 7).
From November 2014 to February 2015, Fogo
produced another effusive eruption similar to that
of 1995. The eruption produced explosions and
ash emissions, lava fountains and aa and pahoehoe
flows that travelled north-northwest towards the
villages of Portola and Bangaeira, due west
towards the village of Ilhéu de Losna, and south-
southeast along the road. All of the Chã residents
were evacuated with lava flows destroying more
than 90% of the main villages, Portela and Ban-
gaeira, a large area of agricultural land, commu-
nication poles and the only road into the area
(Fig. 7). Intermittent ash explosions dispersed and
deposited ash in the main city of São Filipe and
across agricultural crops on the island; the airport
and tourism industry were also impacted. As of
writing, it is unclear if Chã residents will be able to
return, but near-complete reconstruction would be
required to enable repopulation of Chã.
One of the key issues facing risk communi-
cation on Fogo appears to be prioritising con-
cerns about livelihoods for the affected
communities. On Fogo, eruptions are not the
major concern for at-risk communities; popula-
tions are more concerned with a lack of basic
services, drought, and associated food shortages.
The implementation of Fogo National Park in
2003, which aimed to protect the natural envi-
ronment and regulate tourism through land-use
and livestock restrictions, caused conflict
between authorities and Chã residents who
claimed that their livelihoods were adversely
affected by such restrictions (Texier-Teixeira
et al. 2013).
Fig. 7 Annotated photograph of December 2014 lava
flows that buried Portela village. The view is looking
approximately due South with Pico do Fogo to the left of
the image and the steep collapse scar walls to the right.
(Photo S. Jenkins)
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More recent risk communication efforts by the
authorities have included evacuation and com-
munication exercises with a community-based
focus. They have been carried out by SNPC and
one of the local monitoring institutions, the
National Institute of Meteorology and Geo-
physics, with partial support from the Italian Civil
Protection and MIA-VITA (a European research
project). Unfortunately, the exercises found that
tour guides, women, and farmers, some of the
most important groups in Chã das Caldeiras, were
difﬁcult to engage with the exercises and
decision-making (Texier-Teixeira et al. 2013).
Future volcanic risk management and communi-
cation therefore needs to ﬁrst address
socio-economic vulnerabilities and priorities in
order to carry out fully successful risk reduction
measures. The government of Cape Verde had
plans to create a local Fogo civil protection
agency to allow for more community-based
activities (Texier-Teixeira et al. 2013), although
at the time of writing this was not yet operational.
The 2014–2015 eruption and the destruction
of villages within Chãmay have changed the way
volcanic hazard and risk at Fogo are communi-
cated from that suggested by the pre-eruption
studies. Future studies should investigate.
5 Risk and Crisis Communication
for Island Communities
Island communities are frequently portrayed as
being tight-knit with few people being strangers
to each other, suggesting the potential that crisis
response is more efﬁcient because information
travels quickly, people trust each other, and
social structures are more nimble. The three case
studies demonstrate that plenty of truth exists in
such assumptions, but that does not necessarily
ease the situation. Instead, as always with risk-
and disaster-related communication and
knowledge-policy interfaces, multi-faceted layers
intertwine and information flow is not a linear,
predictable process (Barclay et al. 2008; Gaillard
and Mercer 2013; Weichselgartner 2003).
In all three cases presented here, it was not
possible to reach a common denominator and
representation and perception of what a volcanic
eruption is, what are the associated risks, what are
the timescales of volcanic processes and the nec-
essary timescales of risk prevention policies, and
what exactly is happening and could happen in the
particular situation under question. The media’s
role was particularly poignant, with difﬁculties
often resulting for the scientists because the media
and scientists did not have a trusting relation-
ship. Particularly in small communities, it is
important to avoid viewing the media as a separate
or hostile entity, but instead to work them so that
their needs are met but reports are accurate and
informative. The relationship cannot be built
during a crisis, but must start immediately so that
all parties involved have already built an under-
standing of needs when the crisis emerges (see
also Barclay et al. 2008; DFID 2003). The com-
munication challenges can further be overcome
through expanding the capacity and responsibility
of the scientiﬁc community to explain its para-
digms, its methodologies, different types of
uncertainty (epistemic and aleatory), and the lim-
itations to and for different audiences, namely the
authorities, decision-makers, crisis responders,
economic actors, the public, and the media.
An example from Guadeloupe aiming to do so
is the widespread public dissemination of a
monthly activity bulletin by the Observatoire
Volcanologique et Sismologique de Guadeloupe
(OVSG-IPGP) that was launched in 1999 and has
continued ever since (http://www.ipgp.fr/fr/ovsg/
bulletins-mensuels-de-lovsg; http://www.ipgp.fr/
fr/ovsg/actualites-ovsg). A tri-monthly similar
bulletin is issued by the Observatoire Vol-
canologique et Sismologique de Martinique
(http://www.ipgp.fr/fr/ovsm/bilans-trimestriels-
de-lovsm). It would be useful to enact studies to
determine the reach of these bulletins and the
understanding by and interest of those who read
them. What information and styles could the
bulletins include which would appeal to a wider
readership and ensure that uptake of the infor-
mation is increased? Such work will enhance
participatory science, as with the media estab-
lishing a baseline and trust before an emergency
so that crisis communication should be smoother
and more widely accepted.
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As well, as science evolves, new scientiﬁc
approaches could assist in better integrating dif-
ferent sectors into volcanic crisis communication
processes. Again from Guadeloupe, a recent ret-
rospective Bayesian Belief Network analysis of
the unrest of La Soufrière volcano in 1976 (Hincks
et al. 2014; Komorowski et al. 2015) demonstrates
that a formal evidence-based case could have been
made to support the authorities’ concerns about
public safety and the decision to evacuate in 1976.
Development of such novel probabilistic formal-
ism for decision-making could help to reduce
scientiﬁc uncertainty and better assist public ofﬁ-
cials in making urgent evacuation decisions or
policy choices (Woo 2011) should the mild but
sustained and slightly increasing seismic and
fumarolic unrest that began in 1992, and further
developed in 1998, evolve into renewed eruptive
activity (OVSG-IPGP 2015; Villemant et al.
2014; Allard et al. 2014).
Yet the case studies demonstrate the intensity of
politics that manifests in these instances—perhaps
because of, rather than despite, the smallness and
tightness of the communities, amongst other island
characteristics. Consequently, improved informa-
tion and less uncertainty do not straightforwardly
lead to better communication or more harmonious
acceptance of decision-making processes and of
decisions. One fundamental point is the need to
engage with—not just consult—local populations
regarding risk communication and decision-
making, tailoring messages to the various audi-
ences, and being clear regarding what is known
and not known, plus what is feasible to do to ﬁll in
knowledge gaps to support decisions. Activities to
engage citizens in the science emerged to a large
degree in the three case studies, suggesting that
further possibilities be investigated, based on lit-
erature and past work in this area (e.g. Cadag and
Gaillard 2012; DFID 2003; Kelman et al. 2015;
Mercer and Kelman 2010; Texier-Teixeira et al.
2013). Examples of activities are collecting data,
mapping exposure and vulnerability, assisting with
communication, and organising town hall meet-
ings between scientists and citizens—all of which
should happen before a crisis so that a crisis simply
continues this work and the long-standing
relationships, rather than starting anew during the
most difﬁcult time period. Methods exist for
melding knowledge forms to ensure that local
knowledge and non-local knowledge are treated
equally, helping to garner respect and turn infor-
mation conveyance into information exchange
(Mercer et al. 2009)—a process implemented for a
volcanic crisis in Papua New Guinea.
Ultimately, this becomes a collaboration with
communities to ensure that no party or knowl-
edge dominates, but instead information is
exchanged leading to decisions and decision-
making processes which are better understood
and accepted by all who are involved. That is,
living with volcanic risk means working with
communities on their terms.
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